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Introduction 
Oil and cocoa stand as strategic export sectors in Ghana’s economy. The government’s Ghana Shared 
Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) indicates that these sectors together represented 
around 40% of total merchandise exports in 2014 (see Table 1).1 Accordingly, the GSGDA makes clear 
that the government prioritises oil and cocoa in terms of private sector development (PSD) conducive 
to employment creation and taxation generation. All efforts will be taken, according to the GSGDA, 
to ensure the success of PSD efforts within the oil and cocoa commodity chains. In particular, there 
is emphasis on need for enhanced forms of foreign direct investment (FDI) to bolster productive 
capacity in the sectors, and to usher in technological transformations.  
 Meanwhile, the GSGDA has been enthusiastically embraced by the country’s main trade and 
development partners, including the European Union (EU). The most recent National Indicative 
Programme (NIP), signed between the Ghanaian government and the European Commission, 
indicates that the EU will provision Ghana with necessary PSD capacity building to support economic 
and social prosperity through export growth.2 Moreover, the EU has promised to provide further PSD 
assistance to mitigate certain risks associated with a free trade deal being negotiated between 
Europe and the West African region – the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). The EU’s pledge 
to an Economic Partnership Agreement Development Programme (EPADP) will target PSD activities 
in those priority sectors (such as oil and cocoa) identified by West African governments in their 
individual national development plans (such as the GSGDA). These trade and aid ties are themselves 
underpinned by Ghana’s membership of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) bloc, which signed 
the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement in 2000. 
 The article – in the context of the commitments made by the EU – examines the capacity of 
the Ghanaian oil and cocoa sectors to contribute to sustainable development. In particular, it 
explores whether European companies’ FDI does offer a boon to job creation and economic 
prosperity. Moreover, it considers whether EU Aid for Trade towards PSD initiatives are likely to 
enhance pro-poor business growth. In so doing, the article queries certain policy rationales 
associated with a free market approach to sustainable development. Indeed, the article underscores 
certain areas in which EU trade and aid interventions in the oil and cocoa sectors may in fact 
undermine pro-poor SDG objectives. The conduct of European companies, in particular, is not 
something which may automatically lend itself to the normative objectives of sustainable 
development. The discussion is structured as follows. The first section provides background context 
in terms of the current position of the oil and cocoa sectors. The second section examines the oil 
sector in the context of EU companies’ FDI - as well as policy initiatives led by the EU and its member 
states vis-à-vis sector regulation. The third section considers the condition of the Ghanaian cocoa 
sector in the context of EU PSD objectives. The article concludes with a summary of key lessons in 
terms of the EU’s contribution to Ghana’s sustainable development via PSD activities in oil and cocoa. 
Oil and cocoa in Ghana’s pursuit of sustainable development 
The most recent figures from Ghana’s Statistical Service indicate that cocoa bean and oil exports 
constitute the second and third most important commodities respectively in terms of export earnings 
(see Table 2 and Table 3).3 Both sectors’ importance is also repeatedly underscored in the GSGDA, 
which emphasises that the government intends to support PSD objectives to augur economic 
development and job creation as part of sustainable development (see Table 1).4. In particular, the 
government highlights the potential of cocoa agro-processing – combined to oil extraction – as key 
areas for industrial development. The GSGDA remarks that: 
For the attainment of the accelerated job creation and economic transformation… 
the Industry Sector will continue to play a pivotal role, growing at an average 
annual rate of 13.2% over the period 2014-2017. The anticipated drivers in this 
sector include agro-processing, especially by increasing the share of cocoa 
processed locally… [and the] development and production of oil and gas from the 
Jubilee, TEN and Sankofa-Gye Nyame Fields.5 
 
Importantly, this outlook is maintained in other leading development plans. For instance, the 
Ministry of Trade’s Medium Term Strategy (2014-2017) similarly focuses on value addition and 
industrialisation. It underscores the need to meaningfully support agro-processing activities in 
sectors such as cocoa. In addition, it emphasises the need to ‘promote value addition in the 
extractive industry to facilitate local economic development’. It highlights the need to improve 
the ‘development’ performance of key extractive industries, including oil.6 
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In addition, the European Commission – as a leading trade and development partner under 
the Cotonou Agreement – recognises the importance of oil and agro-processing for Ghana’s 
achievement of sustainable development. The most recent NIP confirms that Ghana’s middle income 
status is based largely on its ‘crops such as cocoa… and more recently [on] oil and gas’.9 Moreover, 
the NIP commits the EU to the promotion of Ghana’s ‘sustainable and inclusive growth, with a 
particular focus on rural development’.10 Interestingly, however, the EU also emphasises that 
Ghana’s signing of an EPA free trade deal is essential for its long-term economic wellbeing. The 
European Commission points to how an EPA would secure low tariff access for Ghana’s cocoa 
products (and other agricultural goods) into European markets (see Table 2).11 This is in apparent 
contrast to the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), to which Ghana would default if it failed to 
fully implement an EPA. This picture is complicated by the fact that Ghana initialled a unilateral and 
interim EPA with the EU at the end of 2007. It has, however, now agreed to a full regional EPA, as 
per the Heads of Government of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) 
communication of July 2014.12 As of December 2016, the terms of this regional EPA had gone into 
provisional effect in Ghana and Ivory Coast, while pending application in other West African states.13 
The lack of full regional implementation of the EPA deal (even by January 2017, the time of writing), 
does leave Ghana, however, in a potential legal ‘limbo’ with regards to sustained low tariff market 
access to Europe. Uncertainty with regard to the EPA is of major concern to cocoa producers, 
explored in the third section of the article. 
Importantly, the EU has doubled down on its PSD pledges following the United Nation’s (UN) 
agreement on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The UN SDGs under Goal 8 on Decent 
Work and Economic Growth highlights the need for donors to give additional Aid for Trade and PSD 
assistance to facilitate economic prosperity in developing countries. In response, the European 
Council emphasises the pro-poor contributions of the business community to job creation and social 
prosperity within the post-2015 era: 
Private sector-led economic growth is the principle creator of jobs and as such 
contributes to poverty reduction. The private sector should be fully engaged in the 
implementation of the Post-2015 Agenda… Creating a conducive and stable business 
environment for the private sector and investments is key, including level playing fields 
for competition, as are accountable and efficient institutions.14  
Furthermore, the European Parliament has recently endorsed a resolution on PSD (April 2016). The 
parliament noted the benefits of FDI, if properly regulated, in developing countries. Interestingly, 
however, it also sounded some alarm as to the potential impact of EPAs, and the need for sufficient 
Aid for Trade monies to go towards competitiveness building.15  
 In this context, it is highly relevant to now examine the capacity of the oil and cocoa sectors 
to contribute to sustainable development in Ghana – with the assistance (or lack thereof) of the EU. 
As the recent NIP states, the EU is currently Ghana’s most important export market ‘worth EUR 3 
billion or 42.9% of total Ghanaian export… followed by China (6.5%)’.16 Moreover, for the reasons laid 
out above, the cocoa and oil sectors are particularly interesting to examine given their strategic 
significance. Additionally, they have received relatively sparse attention within academic discussions 
on PSD and sustainable development in Ghana – in stark comparison with gold.17 The following 
sections therefore examine the capacity of oil and cocoa to contribute to sustainable development 
through export growth in Ghana. They also problematize the role of the EU as a trade and aid partner. 
The selection of Ghana, meanwhile, enables the article to examine a middle-income ACP country that 
has regularly been viewed as a ‘donor darling’.18 It allows us to consider the success (or lack thereof) 
of EU PSD interventions in an African country that has been relatively praised for its willingness to 
abide by donor free market rationales. 
Oil extraction and sustainable development in Ghana: the EU as a pro-poor protagonist?  
The discovery of oil in the Jubilee field off Ghana’s coast in 2007 has heralded opportunities – and 
challenges – for sustainable development in this strategic ACP state. As mentioned, the government’s 
own GSGDA now prioritises oil as a key sector for development of extractive industries. There is also 
much emphasis in this document that oil must not become another enclave economy (as arguably 
has become the case with the Ghanaian gold sector).19 Namely, the oil sector must make linkages 
with other areas of the economy in order to ensure that prosperity is shared throughout Ghana. The 
GSGDA, in this context, has emphasised that Ghana should aspire to the processing of oil, and not 
merely to the export of crude oil to refineries in Europe and beyond.20 It is clear from the initial 
exports of crude oil, however, that this resource alone has potential for extremely large export 
earnings vis-à-vis the broader Ghanaian economy. As Table 2 indicates, crude oil has grown to 
impressive export values from initial extraction in 2010 (after preparations which started in 2007). As 
emphasised in the GSGDA – as well as the EU-Ghana NIP – these revenues are expected to increase 
as other oil fields come online (in addition to extractive activities in the Jubilee field). 
 One of the most crucial policy elements in terms of aligning Ghana’s oil extraction to 
sustainable development objectives has been the government’s – and donors’ – emphasis on the 
need for adequate regulation of the proceeds derived from this commodity. In particular there has 
been much focus placed upon Ghana’s joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI).21 This development platform emphasises the need to utilise oil proceeds for sustainable 
development: 
A country’s natural resources, such as oil, gas, metals and minerals, belong to its 
citizens. Extraction of these resources can lead to economic growth and social 
development. However, poor natural resource governance has often led to corruption 
and conflict. More openness and public scrutiny of how wealth from a country’s 
extractive sector is used and managed is necessary to ensure that natural resources 
benefit all.22 
Notably, the EITI places expectations upon both oil companies and local governments to publish 
reliable statistics regarding oil production, values, and sharing arrangements. This is in response to 
the so-called ‘resource curse’ in which developing countries (in particular) have been seen to 
experience increased corruption and civil strife after the discovery of oil deposits (for example, in 
Nigeria after the initial discovery of oil in the 1950s).1 
 Importantly, the Ghanaian government agreed to partake in this EITI platform, completing 
full validation in 2010.23 As a result, a Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (GEITI) was 
established with headquarters in the capital, Accra. The EU, meanwhile, has been a vocal advocate 
of such transparency commitments. Notably, the recent NIP highlights ‘Governance, Public Sector 
Management and Accountability’ as one of its two priorities for facilitating sustainable development 
in Ghana. The NIP thus makes clear that EUR 75 million will be made available for support to public 
sector management.24 It emphasises that one of the key expected results from such aid support is 
that ‘transparency in the management and use of revenues from natural resources, including 
extractive industries (mining, oil and gas) is increased’.25 EU member states, for their part, have taken 
a leading role in encouraging the Ghanaian government to abide by EITI norms. The UK Department 
for International Development (DFID) has in fact recently pledged £14 million for an oil and gas-
specific transparency initiative, known as the Ghana Oil and Gas for Inclusive Growth (GOGIG) 
platform. This will operate from 2015 to 2019 and aims to achieve ‘enhanced policy and regulatory 
coherence across the oil and gas sector’; ‘improved revenue management’; and ‘enhanced sector 
oversight by facilitating cooperation between government and accountability actors’.26 The particular 
interest in the UK in the equitable use of Ghana’s oil monies towards sustainable development owes 
                                                          
1 It is not within the scope of our current discussion to provide a detailed review of the literature on the 
resource curse. See van der Ploeg (2011) for an extensive introduction and overview. It is useful to note here, 
however, that recent contributions to the resource curse debate have emphasised that there is no element of 
‘predestination’ or inevitability with regards to the curse unfolding in states blessed with large quantities of 
natural resource wealth. In particular recent examinations by the Effective States and Inclusive Development 
(ESID) network have explored the political economy of oil extraction in Uganda. They have found that the 
authoritarian, centralised negotiating style of President Yoweri Museveni has in fact helped to secure better 
revenue sharing arrangements than has occurred in states such as Ghana (see for instance Asante and Mohan 
2015 and Hickey et al 2015). This focus on institutional setups is also found in Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) 
who argue that the concept of the ‘resource curse’ itself might be misguided, given the potentiality for African 
governments to positively utilise resource abundance for national growth strategies. This focus on the 
institutional setup of African regimes ties into the broader debates about the potential linkage between 
authoritarianism and developmental states (for instance in Rwanda, as explored by Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 
2012) Indeed, there is evidence that regime structure impacts upon the agency of African governments to 
negotiate fairer extractive arrangements, and, more broadly, to manage relations with foreign investors and 
donors in a fashion that augments locally owned development plans. It is important to note, therefore, that 
while European oil companies do push to maximise their own profits (often with the assistance of EU 
institutions, and the acquiescence of governments such as found in Ghana) nevertheless there is emerging 
debate in the literature as to how African regime structure and elite agency might overcome, or avoid 
altogether, the ‘resource curse’. 
in part to the presence of Anglo-Irish company, Tullow Oil, in the extraction of the commodity in this 
ACP country. 
 It is important to recognise, however, that the role of the EU (via the NIP) and EU member 
states’ own development agencies (such as UK DFID) do not necessarily translate into the tangible 
achievement of pro-poor UN SDG objectives in Ghana. Despite European donor commitments to the 
principles of shared prosperity and sustainable development there are in fact certain grounds upon 
which to doubt whether EU trade and aid interventions are assisting (rather than jeopardising) 
poverty reduction. Notably, there is much concern that EITI instruments – as strongly endorsed by 
the EU institutions – do more to shift focus onto developing country governments, than to hold 
foreign corporations (often those headquartered in EU member states) to account for regressive 
extractive processes. Bazilian et al emphasise here that EITI schemes do not require individual 
companies to disclose their revenue sharing arrangements with governments such as that of Ghana.27 
Instead only aggregate corporate data is disclosed to the public domain. This undercuts transparency 
criteria and veils potential inconsistencies (and injustices) associated with extractive company 
behaviours in the Global South. More broadly, Maconachie and Hilson explain that donors such as 
the EU may utilise such schemes ‘in deflecting criticism’ from their own conduct (and that of their 
corporate entities) while ‘shifting the focus of the resource curse debate towards developing world 
governments’.28 
 Meanwhile, in the specific case of Ghana, the GEITI – as well as the UK DFID sponsored GOGIG 
platform – have supported regressive legislation within the Ghanaian parliament. In particular, there 
is domestic civil society concern from groups such as Fair-Trade Oil Share Ghana that these sector 
bodies (with support from the EU Commission and the EU member states) have lent legitimacy to the 
Oil Exploration and Production (E&P) bill.29 This act recently passed through the Ghanaian legislature 
and has introduced a situation in which the Energy Minister is now able to circumvent competitive 
tendering processes with regards to production in newly discovered oil fields.30 Moreover, civil 
society groups such as the Ghana Institute of Governance and Security lament that the E&P bill has 
failed to remedy the lack of a formal oil Production Sharing Agreement (PSA). This is despite the fact 
that a PSA would do much to gain a fairer proportion of oil revenues for the Ghanaian government, 
rather than for foreign investors such as Tullow Oil.31 Consequently, concerns have been raised that 
European aid monies have been channelled towards platforms such as the GEITI and GOGIG as a 
means of gaining policy influence within Ghana with respect to oil and gas production arrangements. 
Sceptics of the E&P bill conclude that aid monies have done more to entrench the corporate interests 
of European companies such as Tullow Oil than to remedy the ‘resource curse’ (or merely lack of 
equitable revenue sharing) within Ghana.32 
 Furthermore, these concerns about the contributions of the EU to sustainable development 
via pro-poor PSD activities in the oil sector in Ghana are amplified when attention is turned to the 
alleged conduct of companies such as Tullow Oil. Alarmingly, this company was implicated in high 
profile corruption allegations in Uganda, a state which shares many parallels to Ghana as a newly oil-
rich ACP member.33 To confuse matters, representatives of another oil company – Heritage Oil – 
appeared to accuse Tullow Oil of bribery in the Ugandan sector.34 As a result, the Ugandan President, 
Yoweri Museveni, demanded an apology from Tullow Oil for the embarrassment caused to his 
government during this episode. An apology was indeed received by Museveni, although Tullow Oil 
have denied any wrong-doing.35 Nevertheless, this incident does raise potentially serious concerns 
about the situation of European companies, such as Tullow Oil, in Ghana. This is particularly the case 
since – as the EU-Ghana NIP itself recognises – the Ghanaian political system remains vulnerable to 
graft and corruption issues. There is therefore the possibility that the aforementioned E&P law, and 
its loophole allowing the Energy Minister to bypass standard tendering practices, might encourage 
predatory behaviour on the part of oil companies. This would potentially enhance foreign corporate 
profits (and the wealth of individual ministers) while denying the Ghanaian people a fair share of their 
sovereign natural resource wealth. This is again underscored by the lack of a formal PSA in Ghana, a 
fact that the E&P law did not redress. 
 In similar terms, there is also concern that foreign companies such as Tullow Oil have 
successfully agreed ‘stabilisation clauses’ with the Ghanaian government that now compel it to 
compensate the company for any profit losses associated with stricter social or environmental 
regulations.36 Rather than support pro-poor forms of PSD in conjunction with the UN SDGs, this EU 
headquartered company (at least for the time being, prior to UK Brexit) is therefore understood by 
certain civil society activists to lock-in regressive models of extraction in sub-Saharan Africa. Platform 
London, for instance, claims that: 
Tullow's website gives the impression that the company is big on transparency. Yet for 
five crucial years, Tullow refused to publish the contracts they signed with the 
Ghanaian government to develop the Jubilee oil field. The contracts were effectively 
signed in secret without meaningful public or political debate. As a result they included 
"stabilization clauses" which lock-in weak social and environmental regulations at the 
time the contract was made. If Ghana passes new laws that set higher standards, it will 
have to compensate Tullow for the cost of compliance.37  
This civil society group also point to the environmental resource repercussions of oil extraction 
undertaken in Ghana by Tullow Oil. Namely, that fishing has been compromised by exclusion zones 
that now surround the offshore oil platforms. This is seen as deleterious for local fishing livelihoods, 
as well as for wider food security in this middle income ACP country.38 Meanwhile – in the context of 
lost fishing livelihoods – there is concern that oil companies are not enabling Ghanaian citizens to 
benefit from skilled employment in this commodity sector. While Tullow Oil (and its US competitor 
Kosmos) claim that 80% of generated employment has gone to local people, this often reflects low-
skilled and poorly paid forms of jobs. The Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network, for instance, states 
that Ghana’s: 
government should be looking at the kinds of jobs the Ghanaians employed in the 
industry are occupying. Ghanaians should not be [only] employed providing support 
services like driving, controlling traffic on the roads and selling food to labourers… the 
oil companies operating in the country are mainly using imported expertise and 
equipment.39 
 Moreover, there is broader concern that European oil companies – including the Anglo-Irish 
firm Tullow Oil as well as France’s Total S.A. – are utilising Ghana as a de facto haven for tax evasion 
purposes. Due to a variety of tax treaties between these EU member states and this ACP country,  oil 
companies can give ‘loans’ to their subsidiaries in Ghana as a means of reducing their overall 
corporate tax burden. This situation appears to be unresolved despite (or perhaps because of) the 
passing of the aforementioned E&P bill. The director of the African Centre for Energy Policy (ACEP) 
has explained the complicated practices by which this situation arises: 
if they [European oil companies] are operating in a [European] country that has double 
tax treaty with Ghana and the withholding tax on cross-border loans is higher [within 
Europe], what they do is to lend to countries where the tax is lower [thus countries such 
as Ghana]… most of the companies … Tullow Oil from the UK… Total Oil from France… 
[they will pay] rent to their subsidiaries in Ghana where the withholding tax on the 
interest that Ghana will pay to them is eight per cent instead of lending to corporations 
within France, within the UK, or in Italy [where the withholding tax is higher]. 
 It is necessary to also note that the EU’s pursuit of an EPA in West Africa will not tangibly 
benefit the oil sector in this ACP site of PSD activities. Given the fact that Ghana remains reliant upon 
the export of unrefined crude oil, it will not gain a tariff advantage in this commodity line via the 
signing of a free trade agreement.40 Moreover, the EU’s promised Aid for Trade monies under the 
transitional EPADP vehicle appears to offer Ghana less than the amount of lost tariff revenues which 
it will incur upon the implementation of an EPA. Therefore, the EPADP does not offer any additional 
‘new’ monies for support to PSD and upgrading in sectors such as oil (or cocoa). It merely provides a 
short-term compensation for finances which will be lost to the Ghanaian treasury through tariff 
dismantling upon products entering this ACP country from EU member states. Overall, therefore, 
there are several grounds upon which to contest the EU’s ostensible contributions to sustainable 
development through PSD activities in priority ACP sectors such as Ghanaian oil. Rather than provide 
opportunities for pro-poor growth, there appear to be circumstances in which European corporations 
gain from extractive activities while failing to equitably share revenues with host developing 
countries. EPAs – and the EPADP – meanwhile do not appear a boon for pro-poor UN SDG objectives. 
Cocoa sector and sustainable development in Ghana: Europe as benevolent partner?  
The cocoa sector stands as a significant source of employment and income revenue in Ghana, as 
emphasised by the government in the recent GSGDA. This is demonstrated in the quantitative data 
in Table 3 which indicates that cocoa produce (including beans, butter and paste) generated around 
EUR 324.5 million for Ghana’s economy in 2015 alone.41 This is a strong and growing Ghanaian sector. 
Moreover, in recent years the global market for raw cocoa and cocoa products has shown significant 
growth with, for example, global sales of chocolate confectionary crossing the landmark figure of 
$100 billion for the first time in 2011. This growth has been accompanied by predictions that 
consumer demand will soon outpace supply.42 New markets for cocoa consumption in Asia are a key 
factor in these predictions of the ongoing strength of the sector. It is the EU, however, which remains 
the world’s largest cocoa consuming region, with its trade with West Africa being the most significant 
inter-regional trade in global cocoa markets. The majority of Europe’s imports of cocoa and cocoa 
products originate from West Africa, which has framed the importance placed on the levels of tariffs 
and other terms of access to the European market within the EPA negotiations. 
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Traditionally the trade between the EU and Ghana has been reliant on the export of raw 
cocoa beans for processing in Europe, predominantly in Netherlands where the world’s largest 
processors Cargill and ADM are located, as well as in Germany, Belgium and France. The dominant 
position of Cargill and ADM accounts for the Netherland’s status as the biggest single processing 
country. This pattern of trade and production accounts for the EU’s position as the world’s leading 
importer of raw beans and exporter of processed cocoa. It is also the most important trade partner 
for Ghana, and the leading destination for its exports, of which raw and processed cocoa represents 
43.5%.44 
The Ghanaian cocoa sector is marked by a clear division between the types and scales of 
economic actors involved in production, marketing and processing within the overall value chain. 
Raw cocoa is predominantly produced by smallholder farmers, often operating as rural collectives. 
In 2008 it was estimated that there were 700,000 cocoa farmers in Ghana.45 The Ghana Cocoa Board 
(Cocobod) now estimates that ‘approximately 800,000 farm families spread over six of the ten 
regions of Ghana’ are employed in the production of raw cocoa.46 The state has retained control of 
the sector, in spite of an era of liberalisation in line with Washington Consensus led Structural 
Adjustment Policies. The government organisation, the Ghana Cocoa Board (Cocobod) plays a central 
role in production, research, the development of the sector, internal and external marketing and 
quality control. It performs these tasks alongside a number of subsidiary organisations such as the 
Cocoa Research Institute, the Seed Production Unit, the Quality Control Division, and the Cocoa 
Marketing Company (CMC) Limited.47 The CMC, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Ghana Cocoa 
Board, has the sole responsibility for the sale and export of Ghanaian cocoa beans and some 
processed cocoa products.48 In contrast to the state controlled market for cocoa beans, cocoa 
processing has mainly been undertaken by a few largescale transnational agro-processing companies 
located both in Ghana and abroad. 
Importantly, the dominance of Ghanaian cocoa-processing by a small number of largescale 
transnational corporations (TNCs) reflects the structure of the global sector, which is characterised 
by high market concentration. 49 The ‘big four’ companies - Barry Callebault, Cargill, ADM and 
Blommer Chocolate Company - controlled 50% of world market grindings in 2006, with that share 
now standing at approximately 61%. 50  In part this structure is driven by the nature of the industry 
as ‘capital-intensive with high sunk costs’ which encourages mergers, acquisitions while deterring 
new entrants.51 The Ghanaian Cocoa Processing Company, a limited company whose two major 
shareholders are the Ghana Cocoa Board and the Government of Ghana, is a minor operator in the 
Ghanaian processing sector and reported a loss of $16.3 million in the 2013-14 financial year.52  
 Significantly, the structure of production and trade of the Ghanaian cocoa sector has been 
recognised as posing constraints in relation to possible levels of returns to the broader economy. 
This has prompted an array of policy responses. Indeed, the Ghanaian government has emphasised 
the need to support domestic processing as a means of value addition and job creation. This seeks 
to promote the transition of the domestic sector from the production and export of raw cocoa beans 
to higher levels of industrialisation. This was evidenced in the 2012-2016 Country Strategy Paper 
(signed between the EU and Ghana) which identified a need to develop agricultural production and 
agro-processing, particularly via improved agricultural processing technology.53 The government’s 
GSGDA platform also underscores the need to attract enhanced FDI into processing to bolster 
employment opportunities, and to ensure that Ghana moves beyond the sole export of unprocessed 
agricultural produce. These initiatives echo the thinking of key actors in the EU. A recent European 
Parliament resolution in April 2016, for example, emphasised that developing countries should focus 
upon value addition and agro-processing activities to create skilled, decent jobs. Crucially, the 
European Commission also regards the EPA as providing ‘incentives for new investments and job 
creation in Ghana’,54 as well as providing opportunities for the development of the business 
environment and the diversification of productive sectors.55 However as demonstrated by the 
current fortunes of the Cocoa Processing Company, the potential for domestic cocoa-processing 
capacity in Ghana to challenge the dominance of largescale TNCs in the processing sector is 
questionable.  
Moreover there is much concern (particularly within the cocoa sector in Ghana itself) that 
the uncertainties associated with the EU’s EPA in the West African region may undermine processing 
opportunities. For example, neighbouring Nigeria defaulted to the GSP upon its refusal to sign an 
interim EPA by the original deadline of December 2007. At time of writing in January 2017, the 
regional West African EPA is yet to be fully applied in Nigeria. This underscores pre-existing 
consternation in Ghana that the regional trade agreement may in fact be stillborn due to non-
ratification in key constituent countries (despite preliminary application in Ghana itself as of 
December 2016).2 Accordingly, Nigerian cocoa processors have faced higher tariffs upon entry into 
EU member states, effectively making them less competitive as compared to other ACP countries 
(such as Ghana) that had acquiesced in 2007 to the terms of EU free trade arrangements. There is 
currently concern in Ghana, that should the regional West African EPA collapse, then its own 
processors will default to the GSP and therefore face additional competitive pressures when 
exporting goods into the EU market. Furthermore, the promises of the European Commission to 
furnish agricultural production, including cocoa, with Aid for Trade monies under the NIP – as well 
as the EPADP – is met with scepticism on the part of local business stakeholders. This is underscored 
by the fact that the EPADP merely cushions the impact of lost tariff revenues (upon EPA 
implementation), and do not therefore represent ‘new’ money per se for agricultural investments.3  
 Meanwhile, Ghanaian officials’ focus upon domestic cocoa processing as part of a 
sustainability agenda is accompanied by a focus on securing levels of supply required to meet current 
and future demand. As part of this long-term outlook, officials have identified the need to redress 
existing social and environmental concerns within the sector. Recent government policies include 
initiatives to tackle issues such as the ageing farming population in the rural hinterland, as well as 
the deterioration of existing cocoa trees, often as a result of disease. For example, the government’s 
Ghana Strategy Support Programme (GSSP) included technical and social support to impoverished 
smallholders, with an eye to long-term sustainability.56  This has been accompanied by the 
transnational Africa Cocoa Initiative, which has brought together the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF), 
the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Dutch Sustain Trade Initiative (IDH) in 
a multi-agency programme that commits to improve cocoa yields. European and US headquartered 
corporations have also developed their own strategies to address commercial concerns (in relation 
to predicted shortfalls in supply), as well as civil society critiques relating to the social and 
environmental costs of production. For example, Nestle’s Cocoa Procurement System, Cargill’s Cocoa 
Promise Scheme and Barry Callebaut’s Cocoa Horizons all promote sustainable cocoa sourcing as part 
of a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) agenda aimed at environmental protection and the 
elimination of child labour.57 Similarly, FairTrade programmes and sustainability certification 
schemes within EU countries (and beyond) have encouraged European consumers to favour cocoa 
produce that prioritises greater incomes for smallholder producers.58 This has been matched by 
                                                          
2 Please see Langan and Price (forthcoming) for more detail on this consternation within the Ghanaian cocoa 
sector with regards to the ambiguous status of the region-wide EPA (given the refusal of states such as Nigeria 
to fully ratify and implement the free trade deal). This relates to the authors’ own fieldwork in Ghana, and 
Nigeria, which explored the views of business stakeholders involved in cocoa production and processing, as 
well as the Ghanaian Limited Buying Companies who act as intermediaries between producers and Cocobod. 
3 For reasons of space and remit it is not possible to expand on the interview data in this current article; again 
please see Langan and Price (forthcoming) for more detail. 
European governments, such as that of Germany and Netherlands, actively adopting sustainable 
cocoa consumption initiatives.  
 The European Commission itself, for its part, has placed specific focus on the need to combat 
child labour within ACP-EU trade networks. This has gained particular policy resonance since the 
conclusion of the UN SDGs, given their emphasis on decent work objectives and child welfare. A staff 
working document issued by the European Commission on child labour issues highlighted the case 
of Ghanaian cocoa (as well as that of Ivory Coast) as being prone to forms of unjust labour in its 
supply chain.59 This policy emphasis has also been adopted by the European Parliament which issued 
a 2011 resolution calling for the EU institutions to redress labour injustices in developing country 
trade links. In response to such concerns, the European Cocoa Association (ECA) and CAOBISCO (the 
European confectionary body) issued a joint statement which recognised ongoing problems in West 
African cocoa production. In the case of Ghana, in particular, these European corporate bodies noted 
that a ‘public certification process is underway’ to discourage use of children in value chains.60 
With parallels to the oil industry, however, there are several grounds on which to question 
whether the EU is meaningfully supporting sustainable development via ‘pro-poor’ PSD activities in 
the cocoa sector. In relation to livelihoods and social prosperity, for example, the 2015 Cocoa 
Barometer warns that incomes are not sustainable for cocoa famers, who are operating in conditions 
of extreme poverty. Farmers earn as little as 84 cents a day and gain around 6.6% of the total 
proceeds of chocolate production, down from 16% in 1980.61 Accordingly, young farmers are not 
replacing the old due to low pay and ongoing precarity in the system (despite the onset of the multi-
stakeholder initiatives mentioned above). In addition, there are concerns that donor and 
government initiatives aimed at increasing cocoa production – when combined to high rates of adult 
out-migration – might unwittingly exacerbate child labour.62 While child labour in Ghana’s cocoa 
sector fell between 2008/9 and 2013/14 (see Table 4), this could be jeopardised by increased cocoa 
production if donor and government authorities are not sufficiently cognisant of the issue. This is 
particularly worrying since the tasks in which children continue to be engaged are recognised by both 
the Ghanaian government and the International Labour Organisation as being among the ‘worst 
forms of child labour’. This is made clear in a recent report by Sudwind and Global 2000 on 
Bittersweet Chocolate which details ongoing problems in the Ghanaian and Ivorian cocoa sectors: 
children can be found working on many different tasks related to cocoa farming. They 
use machetes and other dangerous tools to remove cocoa pods from trees and to crack 
them open. They carry heavy loads of cocoa beans from the field to drying racks, they 
are exposed to dangerous chemicals such as pesticides and fertilizers and often endure 
long hours in the sun. 63 
 
European chocolate companies and retailers continue to make large profits while child labour and 
low pay remain endemic within their cocoa supply chains. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE WITH ENDNOTE64 
 
Moreover, Maconachie and Fortin argue that such donor and government initiatives can 
possibly have negative impacts on the gendered division of labour. Namely, that they might 
unwittingly intensify the burden on women who remain marginalized in the sector due to social 
norms and structural barriers.65 Typically it is women who often do most of the physical agricultural 
work, lack land rights, and combine agricultural work with caring and domestic responsibilities (while 
male family members sell the crops and control household financial resources).66 This of course does 
not detract from the need to address the issue of cocoa supply and production demands. It does, 
however, call for much greater gender sensitivity as to how donor and government initiatives aimed 
at increasing production are felt within local communities. This point is made convincingly by 
Marston who states that: 
Many of the existing programs have tended towards community development in cocoa 
communities without understanding the links of female beneficiaries to their supply 
chains. Programs that focus on supporting and enabling women’s contribution to the 
productivity, quality and sustainability of the cocoa supply chain have been fewer.67  
 Accordingly, donors such as the EU must do much more to meaningfully work with the Ghanaian 
government to tailor appropriate programmes to ensure genuine gender justice in cocoa supply 
chains  (while also dealing with the problem of ongoing use of child labour).68  
 In addition, despite the current policy focus of the GSGDA and EU institutions on agro-
processing for job creation and social prosperity, there has only been limited graduation from 
primary production to value added processing activities within Ghana.69 Where there has been 
growth in ‘origin grindings’, this has been dominated by European and US agro-processing companies 
who often import skilled labour, rather than train local citizens.4 Meanwhile, these largescale TNCs 
have benefitted from generous tax exemptions for their investments into local processing capacity, 
for example in the ‘Free Zone’ of Tema near Accra (namely, an export processing zone – EPZ). The 
Ghanaian government has not therefore benefited from significant taxation revenues from this FDI 
presence, nor have sizeable numbers of local skilled jobs been created. Moreover, there is concern 
that the expansion of European and US corporate activity in the Ghanaian cocoa sector has 
undermined the position of existing domestic processors, such as the Cocoa Processing Company. In 
response, public-private strategies have been developed such as a joint venture between the state 
owned Cocobod and the German grinding company Host-Hammester, although these remain at an 
early stage of development.  
It is important to note, furthermore, that the above concerns raised in the context of the 
Ghanaian cocoa sector are mirrored in terms of the structure of global agro-processing supply chains 
more broadly. Haigh succinctly characterises this as the ‘corporate takeover’ of African food systems 
as part of North-South trade networks - a takeover which he argues is facilitated by leading donor 
states as well as certain host African governments.70 Often buttressed by the strategic channelling of 
donor aid monies to host countries, largescale corporations (such as the ‘big four’ cocoa processors) 
have successfully accessed land resources at the expense of small scale farmers and food security on 
the continent.71 The intensification of corporate activity in sub-Saharan African, moreover, has been 
pursued in order to secure long-term supply – as well as companies’ ongoing profitability: 
                                                          
4 Such largescale agro-processing companies are keen to develop domestic processing capacity to integrate 
their internal supply chain, shipping and production, reflecting the horizontal and vertical concentration that 
is increasingly characterising the global cocoa value chain.4  This has been facilitated by technological 
innovation and financial incentives. While traditionally high grade beans were exported for processing abroad, 
technological developments now allow low quality beans to be processed into an exportable value added 
product at origin, which is then exported for further processing abroad 
securing supplies of cash crops for export is one of the reasons multinational companies 
are so keen to increase their activities in Africa. For example, global cocoa traders and 
processors are predicting a one million ton shortage of cocoa in 2020. This is due to 
climate change and a shortage of cocoa farming as a result of low prices, urbanization 
and competition for land from alternative crops and mining.72 
This concern about the corporate takeover of agro-processing supply chains with regards to African 
countries is echoed by many other actors. For instance, Elizabeth Mpofu, the General Coordinator of 
the international peasant movement, La Via Campesina, similarly argues that TNCs are pursuing 
avenues in African countries for industrial farming, appropriating land and other resources while 
poorly remunerating workers, ignoring social issues (such as child labour and gendered injustice in 
cocoa production) and avoiding full taxation (often through gaining EPZ status as occurs in the 
Ghanaian port town of Tema).73 Such critiques have prompted activist and advocacy networks, such 
as the pan-African Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa, to coalesce in opposition to what they 
regard as the corporate industrialisation of African agriculture74 
Altogether, therefore, the Ghanaian government’s and EU donor’s common emphasis on the 
contributions of PSD, increased cocoa yields and the expansion of processing activity to pro-poor 
sustainable development goals must be problematized. Rather than spurring genuine forms of pro-
poor economic growth, policies aimed at enhancing production while paying inadequate attention 
to workers’ incomes, taxation revenues and social concerns (surrounding gendered inequalities and 
child labour) might exacerbate ill-being in Ghana. Moreover, it appears that it is largescale European 
headquartered agro-processors who have been best placed to maximise the benefits of the 
relationship between the EU and Ghana. While the Ghanaian state has maintained a high level of 
control of its cocoa sector, it faces ongoing pressures for increased liberalisation from the EU via the 
EU-West Africa EPA which commits Ghana to a twenty year process of free market reform. This, 
accompanied by a concomitant threat that Ghanaian cocoa might suffer the fallout from a default to 
the GSP, creates much uncertainty in relation to the future sustainable development of the sector.  
Conclusion  
The case studies demonstrate the centrality of two main commodities, oil and cocoa, to the Ghanaian 
economy. Unsurprisingly both sectors have been targeted as key drivers of future economic 
development and employment creation, particularly through a shift from the production of raw 
commodities to higher levels of value added activities. In the context of the global sustainability 
agenda represented by the UN SDGs in the post-2015 consensus, the development of these key 
sectors is continually framed in terms of pro-poor growth and poverty alleviation (allied to 
environmental concerns). As such they have become central to state-led strategies, such as the 
GSGDA, as well as ACP countries’ development partnerships with corporate investors and donor 
partners. This is particularly the case in relation to the EU-Ghana relationship. However, while there 
is a strong discursive emphasis on pro-poor growth and poverty alleviation via PSD activities in (EPA) 
free market conditions, the case studies reveal the potential limitations of this policy approach. 
While the European Commission’s policy communications – and NIP funding frameworks -
emphasise the social gains of PSD in developing countries in terms of job creation and taxation 
revenues, the case studies demonstrate that it is often large-scale EU headquartered enterprises that 
have predominantly benefitted from FDI and PSD rather than local peoples. In both case studies it 
has been European corporations with links to key states such as the UK, Netherlands, Germany and 
France, that have leveraged their positions in global supply chains and that have influenced policy 
decisions (such as the oil E&P bill) to generate larger surpluses. In contrast, Ghanaian citizens – 
especially cocoa smallholders and fishermen (denied access to resources by oil activities) - continue 
to face precarious conditions on very low incomes, reflecting an inequitable share of the gains within 
Ghana-EU trade networks. While there has been a move towards initiatives to rebalance the position 
of Ghanaian economic actors, for example via policy focus on redressing child labour in cocoa or 
creating skilled jobs in oil, there remain significant questions as to the success of these strategies. In 
addition the returns to the Ghanaian economy from these sectors have been severely limited by tax 
exemptions and opaque relationships between corporate actors (such as Tullow Oil) and domestic 
government.  
Moreover, it is important to re-emphasize that future relations between the EU and Ghana 
will be conditioned by the EU-West Africa EPA. While the EPA has been provisionally applied in Ghana 
since December 2016, nevertheless this region-wide deal might still yet unravel due to the continuing 
reluctance of key ECOWAS members – Nigeria and Liberia – to implement its terms. It will be 
important to monitor, assuming the region-wide EPA does not collapse, how tariff dismantling and 
lost tariff revenues will impact the Ghanaian government amidst its attempt to achieve the GSGDA. 
It is notable here that EU aid monies for PSD initiatives are not ‘additional’ or ‘new’ – but rather 
provide a short-term cushion for monies lost through free market liberalisation and tariff reductions. 
It remains questionable, therefore, whether EU aid budgets will meaningfully spur enhanced forms 
of ‘pro-poor’ PSD within Ghana. Meanwhile, the economic significance of export-orientated sectors 
such as oil and cocoa will continue to grow – particularly as import-competing sectors struggle after 
liberalisation in a post-EPA environment. ‘Sustainable development’, in these conditions, would 
appear a very significant challenge, one which the Ghanaian government may well fail to attain. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1: Cocoa and gold as strategic sites of PSD and exports in Ghana’s economy (2010-13) 
Share of Total 
Merchandise 
Exports (%) 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Cocoa Beans 20.07 15.14 16.18 11.72 
Crude Oil - 21.77 21.96 28.25 
Gold 29.79 23.32 19.25 22.71 
 
Table 2: Ghana’s main export earnings in Cedis Million (2011-2015) 
Commodity 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Gold bullion 
 
5,111.7 8.947.7 8115.8 12416.8 14605.0 
Cocoa beans, 
superior 
quality raw 
beans 
  
3.127.7 3530.4 2694.3 5787.4 10146.6 
Petroleum 
oils and oils 
obtained 
from 
bituminous 
minerals, 
crude 
4325.8 6613.7 5885.9 12807.1 9822.8 
 
 
 
Table 3: Ghana’s cocoa exports to the EU, and tariffs under EPA or GSP arrangements (2015) 
Export produce Total value EUR 
million 
Tariff rates under EPA Tariff rates under GSP 
Cocoa paste 191.8 0% 6.1% 
Cocoa butter 101.3 0% 4.2% 
Cocoa powder 31.4 0% 2.8% 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Table 4: Ghanaian cocoa production and child labour (2008/09 and 2013/14) 
 
Ghana cocoa survey period 2008/09 2013/14 
National cocoa production 
(tonnes) 
0.66 0.90 
Children, 5-17 years old, in 
total population (million) 
2.16 2.24 
Child labourers in cocoa 
production (million) 
0.95 0.92 
Children in hazardous work  
(million) 
0.93 0.88 
 
 
 
 
 
